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Abstract 
 
Corporate culture does matter. Using data on mission statements of large Japanese 
firms, we show that corporate culture has a significant impact on corporate policies 
that determine employment, board, and financial structures. We provide evidence that 
strong-culture firms are more likely to retain incumbent employees, promote managers 
from within firms, and have less debt and a higher percentage of interlocking 
shareholdings than weak-culture firms. This evidence suggests that strong-culture 
firms consider their culture to be organizational capital and adopt policies to preserve it. 
We also confirm that culture and its embedding contribute to better corporate 
performance. We find these culture effects to be considerable in magnitude and at least 
as large as those of other factors, and assert that the role of culture must be taken into 
account in order to understand corporate policies and performance. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, corporate culture has been acknowledged to be a significant determinant of 
organizational behavior and performance. The press and the mass media often make 
references to a specific corporation’s culture, such as the HP Philosophy, the IBM Way, 
and 3M Value, and attribute each company’s competitive advantage to its culture. 
Furthermore, several books and various case studies have focused on corporate culture 
to explain how it works, how it changes and evolves, and how it influences behavior 
and corporate performance (e.g., Deal and Kennedy, 1982: Schein, 1985: Collins and 
Poras, 1994). 
In spite of the popular attention paid to corporate culture, however, very few 
quantitative studies have been conducted to establish its importance. The scarcity of 
quantitative evidence can be attributed to the fact that corporate cultures have tacit, 
ambiguous, and unobservable aspects, which are usually hard to measure using 
publicly available information, and thus pose an obstacle to quantitative analysis. 
There are a few exceptional works such as Denison (1984), Gordon and DiTomaso 
(1992), Kotter and Heskett (1992), and Sorensen (2002) which report that corporate 
culture and cultural strength are associated with superior performance. However, these 
previous studies focused almost exclusively on culture’s impact on performance.  
Needless to say, ascertaining the statistically significant performance effects of culture, 
and determining whether a particular culture enhances or harms performance are not 
easy tasks.  
In this paper, we examine the significance of corporate culture by focusing on 
its impact on corporate policies. Considering corporate culture to be organizational 
capital, we set forth the hypothesis that culture shapes corporate policies that determine 
employment, board and financial structures. More specifically, we hypothesize that 
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strong-culture firms are more likely to retain incumbent employees, promote managers 
from within firms, and reduce the probability of default and hostile takeovers than 
weak-culture firms. 
One of the distinguishing features of this paper is the use of the mission 
statement as a proxy for corporate culture. It is true that it is not always clear whether 
the norms and values of the mission statement have actually been adopted and 
implemented by the corporation. But the advantage of using the mission statement is 
that it puts into writing the norms and values that corporations require their employees 
to share and adopt. We also examine how the mission statement is embedded among 
employees in order to identify the strength of a particular corporate culture.  
Our study is conducted on large-sized Japanese firms for the period from 1986 
to 2000. The corporate culture of Japanese firms has attracted much attention since the 
1980s, when it was considered to be a source of their competitive advantage in global 
markets (Ouchi, 1981: Pascale and Athos, 1981). Despite this attention, however, little 
quantitative evidence on the importance of the corporate culture of Japanese firms has 
been collected.  
Testing for the period when Japanese firms were buffeted by unexpectedly 
large business fluctuations arising from the burgeoning and collapse of the bubble, the 
subsequent long-term recession, and the banking crisis of 1997, our empirical results 
show that corporate culture and its strength significantly affect corporate policies.  
Through business upturns and downturns, strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt 
policies that encourage long-term employment, and to have more managers promoted 
from within the firm than weak-culture firms.  Strong-culture firms are also more 
likely to have less debt, and a high percentage of interlocking shareholdings than 
weak-culture firms. All of our empirical results show that corporate culture does matter 
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for the policy choices of Japanese companies. Interestingly, in spite of policy choices 
which are frequently regarded to be impediments to corporate performance in the 
finance literature,1 firms with strong cultures performed relatively better throughout 
this period. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 surveys the field of corporate 
culture studies and presents our general observations on various approaches to the 
study of corporate culture. Section 3 presents hypotheses on the effect of culture on 
corporate policies. Section 4 explains our sample, data, measures of corporate culture, 
and regression equations. Section 5 presents our empirical results. Section 6 
summarizes the results and discusses their implications. 
 
2. Background 
2.1 Significance of Corporate Culture: Previous Studies 
It has long been assumed that corporate culture can make a significant contribution to 
corporate performance. Corporate culture, which is sometimes referred to as 
organizational culture, can be defined as “a set of values, beliefs, and norms of 
behavior shared by its (a firm’s) members that influences employee preferences and 
behaviors” (Besanko et al., 2007, p.550). Researchers have claimed that culture can be 
a major source of efficiency in organizations and improve corporate performance (e.g. 
Kotter and Heskett, 1992: Cremer, 1993: Hermalin, 2001: Besanko et al., 2007). They 
have argued that the performance benefits of corporate culture derive from three effects. 
Culture can have a goal-setting effect when it specifies the goals of the firm and makes 
                                                  
1 For example, lower debts levels have been associated with the free cash flow problem and 
interlocking shareholding has been linked to insider control problems (Jensen,1986: Miyajima and 
Kuroki, 2007). 
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it easier for employees to make daily decisions. Culture has a coordination effect when 
it reduces communication costs and facilitates coordination among employees. And 
culture has a motivation effect when employees become more highly motivated as a 
result of embracing the company’s culture. 
The view that corporate culture has a significant influence on performance is 
widely held in academia and by the media, but the empirical evidence that can be 
marshaled to support this view is scant. Most researchers have relied on anecdotes or 
case studies and therefore have produced studies of little quantitative value. The 
difficulty of directly measuring the impact and strength of corporate culture has posed 
obstacles to the conduct of quantitative research in this area. The exceptions are 
Denison (1984), Gordon and DiTomaso (1992), Kotter and Heskett (1992), and 
Sorensen (2002), who report that a strong corporate culture is associated with superior 
performance. However, it is difficult to determine a positive correlation between 
culture and performance because some firms may have nonadaptive or defective 
cultures that actually harm performance (Kotter and Heskett, 1992: Hodgeson, 1996).  
 
2.2 Corporate Culture and Corporate Policies 
As shown above, previous quantitative studies on corporate culture have focused 
almost exclusively on the association between culture and performance. Few studies 
have spotlighted the effect of culture on a firm’s policies and strategies.2 
                                                  
2 The exception is Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson’s (2007) econometric study, which we came across 
in the course of revising our paper. While their study has a title which is similar to ours and 
presents evidence that corporate culture significantly affects a firm’s policies, as does our paper, it 
adopts an approach which is significantly different from ours. They argue that firms with similar 
cultures exhibit similar corporate policies, and seek to prove their argument by showing the 
commonality of investment and financial policies between spinoff and parent firms. By contrast, we 
argue that firms with their own corporate culture adopt policies that preserve the culture as 
organizational capital, and attempt to show that a firm’s cultural strength affects employment, board, 
and financial structures.  
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In this paper, we examine the significance of corporate culture, focusing on 
corporate policies affecting employment, board and financial structures. We 
hypothesize that culture, which can be viewed as firm-specific capital, affects these 
policies. Firm-specific capital, which is also called organizational capital, is an asset 
specific to and embedded into an organization, and includes employees’ skills and 
know-how that have use only within a particular firm, information on each employee’s 
aptitude for a particular job, experience in coordinating diverse production 
technologies, and the goodwill of customers. Firm-specific capital usually has the 
following characteristics: it is a productive resource unique to a particular firm and not 
transferable to other firms; it ceases to be productive when the firm is dissolved; and it 
is accumulated through investment (Prescott and Visscher, 1980: Iwai, 2002: Lev and 
Radhakrishnan, 2004). Corporate culture has these three characteristics of firm-specific 
capital; it is hard to imitate; it disappears with the demise of an organization; and it is 
accumulated through the learning and education of employees. 
If we regard corporate culture to be firm-specific capital and valuable in 
enhancing performance, we can assume that strong-culture firms have an incentive to 
maintain and utilize the culture rather than build a new (different) culture. Preserving 
corporate culture and sustaining the organization in which the culture is embedded can 
increase the firm’s value via two effects. First, it raises current performance. The firm 
takes advantage of its accumulated culture to operate efficiently. Second, it improves 
future performance. Observing that the culture and the organization continue to exist, 
the employees are encouraged to make culture-specific investments which facilitate 
further accumulation of organizational capital. 
Therefore, strong-culture firms can be assumed to adopt policies that preserve 
the culture and the organization, and maximize the benefits emanating from the culture. 
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We can surmise that corporate culture affects the firm’s employment, board, and 
financial structures. We hypothesize that strong-culture firms are more likely to retain 
incumbent employees, promote managers from within, and reduce the probability of 
default and hostile takeovers than weak-culture firms. We will explain these 
hypotheses in the next section. 
 
3. Hypotheses 
We explore the effect of culture on corporate policies by analyzing whether 
strong-culture firms tend to select employment, board, and financial structures that 
help to preserve their own culture and organization. Previous research has defined a 
culture to be strong if norms and values are widely shared and intensely held 
throughout an organization (O’Reilly and Chatman, 1996). We have developed the 
following hypotheses to help explain the relationship between the strength of corporate 
culture and corporate policies and structures.  
Hypothesis 1 (long-term employment):  
Strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt long-term employment policies than 
weak-culture firms. 
As long as their corporate culture is embedded into their employees, strong-culture 
firms are more likely to retain their incumbent employees than weak-culture firms. 
Employees with high levels of cultural knowledge are an important foundation of 
organizational capital. Strong-culture firms tend to hold on to incumbent employees 
rather than hire new workers from labor markets. At the same time, their long-term 
employment policies encourage younger employees to make culture-specific 
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investments to increase future organizational capital.3  Thus, we can assume that 
strong-culture firms are more likely to take long-term employment policies than 
weak-culture firms. 
Hypothesis 2 (internally promoted managers) 
Managers promoted from within firms comprise a greater percentage of the 
management teams at strong-culture firms than at weak-culture firms. 
It is assumed that managers need to fully understand a firm’s culture in order to run the 
firm efficiently. Since a culture consists of values, beliefs, and subtle interpretations, 
internally promoted managers who have worked for the company for a long time have 
an advantage over managers appointed from the outside with respect to knowledge of 
the firm’s culture. Chowdhry and Garmaise (2004) formulated a model that shows that 
cultural complementarity exists among members of an organization. They suggest that 
the culture embedded into employees is functional only when it is also embraced by 
the management. Therefore, the optimal choice for strong-culture firms would be to 
recruit more managers from within their firms to their management teams.4 
Hypothesis 3 (low leverage) 
Strong-culture firms have less debt than weak-culture firms. 
Zingales (2000) argues that financial distress inflicts higher costs on firms with large 
amounts of organizational capital because the distress not only has financial 
                                                  
3 In their model, Carrillo and Gromb (2007) argue that even when a firm conducts restructuring, it 
is preferable to restructure in a way that is compatible with the existing culture, because culturally 
compatible restructuring will not discourage employees’ culture-specific investments.  
4 Collins and Porras (1994) claim that in long-standing companies with strong cultures (which they 
categorize as “visionary” companies), management teams consist of internally promoted managers. 
Ouchi (1981) also point outs that Hewlett-Packard, which is known as a strong-culture firm, had 
avoided hiring managers from outside the firm. 
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repercussions but also destroys the organizational capital. His argument suggests that 
because strong-culture firms have a greater amount of organizational capital than 
weak-culture firms, they are more eager to avoid financial distress. Since the 
possibility of financial distress depends not only on a firm’s performance but also on 
its leverage, strong-culture firms should make capital structure decisions that lead to 
lower debt ratios. In fact, Donaldson (1984) suggests that corporate managers like to 
be able to rely on internally generated cash flow, rather than debt, to stay in business. 
We conjecture that his observation is more likely to apply to strong-culture firms. 
Hypothesis 4 (interlocking shareholding) 
Interlocking shareholdings are more likely to be observed in strong-culture firms 
than in weak-culture firms. 
Iwai (2002) argues that the value of companies characterized by firm-specific 
organizational capital will increase when outside shareholders exercise weaker control; 
and that tighter control by outside shareholders increases the probability of hostile 
takeovers, causing the hold-up problem that prevents employees from investing in 
firm-specific human assets. Zingales (2000) also raises questions about whether 
control should reside in the hands of shareholders, given the importance of 
organizational capital. He accepts the possibility that “the pursuit of shareholders’ 
value maximization may lead to inefficient actions, such as the breach of valuable 
implicit contracts,” as described by Shleifer and Summers (1988, p. 1635). If we 
consider corporate culture to be a form of organizational capital, we can predict that 
strong-culture firms have more incentives to weaken the control of outside 
shareholders in order to protect their employees’ rights. In Japan, interlocking 
shareholdings are widely perceived to be a means of reducing the probability of hostile 
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takeovers and blocking intervention by outside shareholders (Sheard 1994). Hence, we 
can hypothesize that strong-culture firms are more likely to form interlocking 
relationships with banks and other affiliated companies.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Measures of Cultural Strength 
We explore the relationship between corporate culture and corporate policies by testing 
the hypotheses presented in the previous section, using a sample of large Japanese 
firms. The corporate cultures of Japanese firms have attracted much attention from the 
1980s, since they were thought to be a source of their competitive edge in global 
markets (Ouchi, 1981: Pascale and Athos, 1981). Despite this attention, however, little 
quantitative evidence on the importance of corporate culture for Japanese firms has 
been presented. Our study seeks to fill this gap.  
In previous studies on corporate culture, measuring a firm’s cultural strength 
has always been an issue. Denison (1984) measures cultural strength by assessing the 
consistency of responses to his survey items across managers in a firm. Kotter and 
Heskett (1992) construct cultural strength indices from their questionnaire survey of 
managers of rival firms in the same industry. While we recognize the advantages of 
these survey approaches, we adopt a different method which utilizes information on 
corporate mission statements.  
A mission statement is a company’s written statement of its core values, 
mission, purpose, goals, principles, and norms. While it is believed that a large number 
of firms have mission statements, it is not always clear whether the mission statement 
has been fully implemented by a particular firm. However, the advantage of using the 
mission statement as a proxy for corporate culture is that it puts into writing those 
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norms and values that a corporation requires employees to share and adopt, and hence 
can be considered to be an explicit declaration of the corporate culture.  
Hence, we measure the cultural strength of each firm by examining whether a 
firm has a formal mission statement. We assume that firms with formal mission 
statements have stronger cultures than those without such statements. This assumption 
appears to be valid for Japanese firms. After conducting interview research on 
Japanese firms, Ouchi (1981) suggested that defining a mission statement is the first 
step in creating a cooperative corporate culture. Itami and Kagono (1989) claim, in 
their Japanese textbook on management and business, that formulating a formal 
mission statement is the primary method to ensure that an organizational culture will 
be widely shared and transmitted over generations.  
In addition, we also measure the cultural strength of each firm by examining 
whether a firm has taken concrete and effective steps to embed the mission statement 
into employees. We believe that the strength of corporate culture depends not only on 
whether a firm has a mission statement, but also on how effectively the mission 
statement is embedded among employees. It is natural to assume that among firms with 
formal mission statements, those with some concrete and effective means of 
transmitting their content to employees have stronger cultures than firms without such 
means. 
 
4.2 Sample 
We obtained mission statement data on Japanese firms from Kigyo Kodo Shishin 
Jitsureishu (hereafter, KKSJ), which is based on a survey of companies’ mission 
statements conducted by Nikkeiren in June 1997. KKSJ, which was published in 1997, 
contains the mission statements of 207 responding Japanese firms and the concrete 
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measures (if any) that firms took to embed the content of these statements into their 
organization.  
From these 207 firms we selected our sample according to the following 
criteria. First, the firm had to be listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and could be in any industry except finance, electricity, and gas.5 This 
criterion limited our sample to non-financial, non-regulated, and large-sized firms. 
Second, a firm’s formal mission statement had to be disclosed on its internet homepage 
in July 2003. This criterion ensures that a firm has maintained its formal mission 
statement over time and therefore could be considered to have a strong culture. 
Applying these criteria left us with 64 firms. 
Since we test the impact of the mission statement on corporate policies and 
performance using the firms’ data from the mid-1980s, sample firms should have 
introduced mission statements, either the current version or an previous version, prior 
to the mid-1980s, We checked when the identified mission statements of sample firms 
were introduced through company handbooks and other sources. Twenty-two of the 64 
firms established the current version of their mission statement before 1986, and 
continued to use it. Although the remaining 42 firms introduced the current version of 
their mission statement after 1986, they are based on older versions of mission 
statements which have been repeatedly revised.6 Thus, the final sample consists of 64 
firms with enduring mission statements and for that reason they are considered 
strong-culture firms.  
                                                  
5 We exclude firms in these three regulated industries because they are subject to regulations which 
may encourage them to adopt different policies determining employment, board, and financial 
structures than the policies adopted by firms in unregulated industries. 
6 For 39 firms of these 42 firms, we were able to identify when the former version of the mission 
statement was introduced, while the mission statements of the remaining three are too old to 
identify a date of introduction. 
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For each of the 64 strong-culture firms, we found a matching firm that is in 
the same industry as a strong-culture firm,7 and also listed on the First Section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange, but was found not to have a formal mission statement. We 
selected the matching sample firms according to the following criteria, i) the firm is 
not included in KKSJ, ii) the firm’s formal mission statement did not appear on its 
internet homepage in July 2003; and iii) among those firms satisfying the above two 
criteria, the firm’s total assets were closest in value to the assets of the strong-culture 
firm. Following these criteria, we obtained 64 matching sample firms, which we 
categorize as weak-culture firms. In Table 1, we list the 64 strong-culture firms and 
their matching weak-culture firms with their Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE) codes. 
For the sample of 64 strong-culture firms, we obtained information from 
KKSJ on whether each had taken any practical and concrete steps to embed the content 
of the mission statement into employees. We found that 75% of strong-culture firms 
have taken some embedding steps: 31.25% of the firms put up posters or a framed 
copy of the mission statement in places of high visibility; 25% of the firms teach the 
mission statement to current employees in training programs; 21.87% of the firms 
deliver a mission statement booklet to employees; the top management (president or 
CEO) of 18.75% of the firms is engaged in embedding the mission statement through 
speeches, written statements, and direct teaching in the training programs and in day to 
day operations, etc.; 17.18% of the firms published the mission statement in in-house 
magazines; other steps include training programs for newly hired employees, 
affirmations and pledges recited at every morning assembly, distribution of mission 
statement cards, establishment of internal schools and training centers to teach the 
                                                  
7 We used the Tokyo Stock Exchange industry classification scheme which categorizes Japanese 
firms into 33 industries. 
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mission statement, etc.  
Based on the information from 64 strong-culture firms, we then chose firms 
whose cultures seemed to be embedded more deeply and intensively. To do this, we 
used two criteria. We first checked whether the top management (president or CEO) is 
engaged in transmitting the mission statement. Schein (1985) suggests that the leader’s 
attention to culture and deliberate role in teaching it are crucial, and personal 
involvement by a corporate leader is a powerful primary mechanism for culture 
embedding and reinforcement. As we saw above, the engagement of the upper echelon 
of management is observed for 18.75% of the strong-culture firms. We then checked 
whether a firm has any training system for instilling the mission statement. Itami and 
Kagono (1989) and Collins and Porras (1994) stress the importance of training for 
transmitting culture. Kitai and Matsuda’s (2002) empirical study on Japanese firms 
shows that training for newly hired employees as well as teaching by top management 
are significantly effective in embedding culture. We selected firms which had at least 
one of the following training systems to instill the mission statement: training 
programs for current employees or newly hired employees; affirmations and pledges at 
every morning assembly; internal schools or training centers dedicated to instilling the 
mission statement. Of the strong-culture firms, 45.31% had taken such steps.  
 
4.3 Regression Equations 
To test hypothesis 1, the relation between cultural strength and employment policy, we 
estimate the following equations. 
11111 εδγβα ++++= AGETAlnCULTUREEMP                         (1-1) 
( ) 2222221202 εδγβββα ++++++= AGETAlnCULTURETRAINTOPEMP   (1-2) 
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In (1-1), EMP is the average length of service of the employees (years), CULTURE is a 
dummy variable that takes 1 if a firm is a strong-culture firm (a firm with a formal 
mission statement), lnTA is the logarithm of book value of total assets (million yen), 
AGE is a firm’s age (years), and ε1 is the error term. If strong-culture firms tend to have 
a policy of longer-term employment, the coefficient of CULTURE (β1) should be 
positive. In (1-2), we add two dummy variables on the degree of culture embedding, 
mentioned in the previous subsection, to the coefficient of CULTURE; TOP takes 1 if 
the top management (president or CEO) is engaged in transmitting the mission 
statement, and TRAIN takes 1 if at least one of the training systems (training programs, 
affirmations and pledges at morning assembly, internal schools or training centers) are 
used to instill the mission statement. From Hypothesis 1, even among strong-culture 
firms in our sample, firms with more deeply embedded cultures are more likely to 
retain incumbent employees. Therefore the coefficients of TOP × CULTURE (β21) and 
TRAIN × CULTURE, (β22) should be positive.  
 To test Hypothesis 2, the relation between corporate culture and internally 
promoted managers, we estimate the regression equations of INSIDER, the insider 
board ratio (%), [1 − the number of outside directors / the number of members of the 
board of directors] × 100, using the same independent variables as those in (1-1) and 
(1-2). In most Japanese companies, and particularly until the 2000s, the management 
team and the board of directors had not been separated, and the board members 
overlapped with top management. Therefore, the ratio of internally promoted managers 
among the management team can be measured by the ratio of insider directors among 
the board. If Hypothesis 2 is valid, the effect of CULTURE on INSIDER should be 
positive and the effects of TOP × CULTURE and TRAIN × CULTURE should be 
positive. 
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 To test Hypotheses 3 and 4, the effects of culture on capital structure and 
interlocking shareholdings, we estimate the regression equations of DEBT (the debt to 
asset ratio (%) calculated as [total liabilities / the book value of the total assets] × 100) 
and INTERLOCK (the interlocking share ratio (%) calculated as [the number of 
interlocking shares / total number of shares outstanding] × 100), respectively, using the 
same independent variables as those in (1-1) and (1-2). If the cultural strength is 
negatively related to the debt to asset ratio and positively related to the degree of 
interlocking shareholdings, the coefficients of CULTURE, TOP × CULTURE, and 
TRAIN × CULTURE should be negative in the DEBT equations, and positive in the 
INTERLOCK equations.  
Furthermore, to check the robustness of our results, we also estimate the 
regression equation by adding two more control variables to each of the equations. 
These two variables are ROA (operating income to the book value of total assets; %) 
and MKTBK (market-to-book ratio; market value of the total assets to book value of 
the total assets). Including these two variables is important because a firm’s 
profitability (ROA) and its growth opportunities (MKTBK) may affect corporate 
policies and structures. In particular, previous studies have shown that with regard to 
capital structure decisions, these two factors have significant effects on debt to asset 
ratios (e.g. Harris and Raviv 1991, Rajan and Zingales 1995). Therefore adding ROA 
and MKTBK to the equations is necessary to avoid omitted variable bias. In addition, 
by including these control variables, we can compare the economic significance of the 
cultural effects on dependent variables with the other factors’ effects.  
 All financial data except INTERLOCK are obtained from the Nikkei NEEDS 
financial database. INTERLOCK is obtained from Mochiai Jokyo Chosa 
(Cross-Shareholding Survey) by Nippon Life Insurance Research Institute. We 
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estimated the regressions by OLS, using 15 years of panel data from 1986 to 2000 for 
sample firms8. As for the cultural variables (CULTURE, TOP, and TRAIN), we used the 
same value (0 or 1) for the same firm throughout the sample period. We also added the 
year dummies to all regressions to control for year-specific effects.  
 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 Content of Mission Statements 
Table 2 provides details on the content of mission statements of 64 strong-culture firms 
including corporate values, objectives, norms, and behavioral standards. The content of 
these mission statements suggests that they are written declarations of the firms’ 
corporate cultures. Panel A shows corporate values, objectives, and philosophies. As 
can be seen, the majority (71.9%) of firm have mission statements that refer to the 
need to “contribute to society, happiness of mankind, the creation of culture, and global 
prosperity.” Another striking feature is that only 6.3% of firms voice “concern for the 
interests of shareholders,” while many of them emphasize concern for employees. For 
example, 37.5% of the firms state that it is their mission to provide worthwhile and 
fulfilling work for their employees. Panel B shows the types of norms and behavioral 
standards contained in mission statements. Almost half, or 45.3% of the firms, refer to 
“innovation and originality” in their mission statements. “Conscientiousness and 
cordiality on the job” and “rise to the challenge and aggressiveness” appear in the 
mission statements of 31.3% and 18.8% of the firms, respectively.  
 
                                                  
8 When we were unable to obtain a particular year’s data for either a strong-culture firm or its 
matching weak-culture firm, we did not use that year’s data for both firms.  
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5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
The means and standard deviations of the dependent and independent variables in the 
regression equations are summarized in Table 3.9 The first column (Total Sample) 
shows the statistics for 128 firms over our sample period (1986-2000). The second and 
third columns (Strong Culture Firms, Weak Culture Firms) provide the statistics for 64 
strong-culture firms and 64 weak-culture firms, respectively. The fourth column 
(Difference) is the difference in the means of each variable for the strong-culture firms 
and the weak-culture firms. We notice that the mean length of service of employees 
(EMP) for strong-culture firms (16.35) is larger than that for weak-culture firms 
(15.56) and the difference (0.79) is statistically significant at less than the 1% level 
(p-value = 0.000). This is consistent with Hypothesis 1: strong-culture firms are more 
likely to adopt long-term employment policies than weak-culture firms. We also 
observe that the mean of the insider board ratio (INSIDER) is significantly higher for 
the strong-culture firms (92.60) than for the weak-culture firms (87.89); this supports 
Hypothesis 2. As for the capital structure, the debt ratio (DEBT) of the strong-culture 
firms (63.26) is a little higher than that of the weak-culture firms (62.43), but the 
difference is not statistically significant. In addition, the interlocking share ratio 
(INTERLOCK) is significantly higher for the strong-culture firms (28.91) than for the 
weak-culture firms (23.59); this is also consistent with Hypothesis 4. As for the control 
variables, lnTA, AGE and ROA are significantly higher for the strong-culture firms than 
for the weak-culture firms. This supports our decision to control for size, age, and 
profitability in the regressions.    
 
                                                  
9 Table 3 also includes the statistics for PARENT (parent firm’s shareholdings ratio) and FOREIGN 
(foreign investors’ shareholdings ratio), which will be used in the analysis in section 5.4. 
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5.3 Regression Results 
The regression results are summarized in Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7. First, Table 4 shows the 
results of the employment policy regressions. Looking at column (1-1), we find that 
CULTURE has a significantly positive coefficient (0.593, p=0.001). This result holds 
for column (1-1)′, which is regressed on ROA and MKTBK. These results indicate that 
the length of service of the employees is longer for the strong-culture firms than for the 
weak-culture firms. This supports Hypothesis 1 (strong-culture firms are more likely to 
adopt long-term employment policies than weak-culture firms), and suggests that 
corporate culture does affect a firm’s employment policy.  
 In Table 4, it is also interesting to examine the results of (1-2) and (1-2)′ 
where two variables for the degree of culture embedding are introduced in the 
regression. We find that in (1-2)′ the coefficients of TOP × CULTURE and TRAIN × 
CULTURE are significantly positive at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. This 
suggests that even among strong-culture firms, a firm is more likely to retain current 
employees once its culture is more deeply embedded into its organization. Firms 
appear to consider employees who embody the firm’s culture as accumulated 
organizational capital.  
 We should also note that the effect of culture on the firm’s employment policy 
is not only statistically significant but also of considerable magnitude. The result (1-2)′ 
indicates that if a firm has a strong culture and top management is engaged in culture 
transmission, its EMP is 1.227 (= 0.247 + 0.980) years longer than that of weak-culture 
firms. Moreover, if this firm has some cultural training systems as well, its EMP is 
1.684 (= 0.247 + 0.980 + 0.457) years longer than that of weak-culture firms. These 
culture effects are much larger than effects of other factors on employment policy. We 
can measure the effects of other factors by the effect of a one-standard-deviation 
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change in other independent variables on EMP, which is computed as the estimated 
coefficient of each variable × one standard deviation of each variable. We computed 
this for each variable and found that AGE had the largest effect among the other 
variables: the AGE effect equals 0.690 (= 0.040 × 17.25) years. This AGE effect is, 
however, only about 40-55 percent as large as the above culture effect. This implies 
that corporate culture and its strength are crucial determinants of corporate 
employment policy. 
 Table 5 provides regression results on the insider board ratio. The results (2-1) 
and (2-1)′ indicate that the coefficient of CULTURE is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% confidence level. These results support Hypothesis 2: firms with 
stronger cultures tend to have more internally promoted managers.10 On the other hand, 
the results (2-2) and (2-2)′ show that the effects of two culture embedding variables 
(TOP × CULTURE and TRAIN × CULTURE) do not have significant effects. However, 
from (2-2)′, we confirm that the magnitude of the culture effect is considerable for the 
board structure as well. The estimated coefficient of CULTURE, 4.179, indicates that 
the insider board ratio is 4.179 percentage points higher for strong-culture firms than 
for weak-culture firms. This effect is the largest among the effects of all factors, with 
respect to board structure. The effect of a one standard deviation change in AGE on 
INSIDER is only 2.243 (= 0.130 ×17.25) percentage points, and the effect of ROA and 
lnTA is 1.374 (= 0.469 ×2.93) percentage points and 0.880 (= 0.672 ×1.31) percentage 
points, respectively. These results allow us to conclude that corporate culture 
significantly affects the firm’s board structure.  
                                                  
10 This result appears to contrast with the findings of Cronqvist, Low, and Nilsson (2007). They 
find that commonality in spinoff and parent firms’ policies is still observed even when the spinoff 
CEOs are outsiders, suggesting that the appointment of outside managers does not necessarily 
trigger clashes of corporate cultures. 
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Table 6 summarizes the regression results on the debt-to-asset ratio (DEBT). 
The results (3-1) and (3-1)′ indicate that CULTURE has a statistically significant 
negative effect on the firm’s leverage. This supports Hypothesis 3: strong-culture firms 
tend to have less debt. In addition, the results of (3-2) and (3-2)′ show that the 
coefficients of TOP × CULTURE as well as those of CULTURE are significantly 
negative. These results suggest that corporate culture and its strength affect even the 
firm’s capital structure decisions. While there have been extensive studies on capital 
structure, we provide the first evidence that the strength of corporate culture is a 
determinant of the firm’s capital structure choice. Our result seems intuitive once we 
regard corporate culture as organizational capital which depreciates in the face of 
financial distress.  
In fact, the magnitude of the culture effect is significant in the debt to asset 
ratio regressions. The result (3-2)′ indicates that if a firm has a strong culture with top 
management engagement in embedding, the debt to asset ratio decreases by 5.099 
(2.504 + 2.595) percentage points. The magnitude of the culture effect is similar to that 
of the effects of other factors such as size, profitability, and growth opportunities which 
are well known as determinants of capital structure from previous studies (e.g. Harris 
and Raviv 1991, Rajan and Zingales 1995). The effect of a one standard deviation 
change in lnTA is 5.921 (= 4.520 × 1.31) percentage points; the effect of ROA is −4.225 
(= −1.442 × 2.93) percentage points; the effect of MKTBK is −2.017 (= −3.202 × 0.63) 
percentage points, respectively. Our results suggest that corporate culture matters in 
determining capital structure and that the firm-specific capital or organizational capital 
significantly affects corporate finance policies.  
 Table 7 summarizes the regression results on interlocking shareholdings. The 
results (4-1) and (4-1)′ indicate that CULTURE has significantly positive effects on 
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interlocking shareholdings. For example, the result (4-1)′ shows that the interlocking 
share ratio of strong-culture firms is 5.671 percentage points higher than that of the 
weak-culture firms, ceteris paribus. This result supports Hypothesis 4: interlocking 
shareholdings are more likely to be observed in strong-culture firms. On the other hand, 
the results in (4-2) and (4-2)′ show complex relationships between cultural strength 
and the interlocking shareholdings. While the coefficients of CULTURE are 
significantly positive in (4-2) and (4-2)′, the coefficients of the culture embedding 
variables, TOP × CULTURE and TRAIN × CULTURE, are significantly negative. This 
suggests that the relationship between cultural strength and the interlocking 
shareholdings is non-linear; if corporate culture is formalized by the mission statement, 
the degree of the interlocking shareholdings increases; but as the culture is transmitted 
to and embedded into the organization, the degree of interlocking shareholdings 
decreases.  
The negative relationship between culture embedding and interlocking 
shareholdings is inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. Why do we observe such a negative 
relationship? One possible explanation is that hostile takeovers are less likely to occur 
as corporate culture is more deeply embedded into the organization. Once cultural 
strength reaches a significant level, allowing the firm to enjoy a competitive advantage 
from its strong culture, outside investors will not take over the firm because they know 
that doing so would destroy the corporate culture and decrease the firm’s value. If the 
decline in shareholder value arising from the decrease in the firm’s value is greater 
than the rent extracted from the takeovers, outside investors are deprived of their 
incentive to implement a hostile takeover. In that case, the employees do not have to 
worry about the hold-up problem and the necessity of interlocking shareholdings 
decreases. This may be the reason we obtained negative signs for the culture 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-001? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
 22
embedding variables in (4-2) and (4-2)′.11  
 
5.4 Corporate Culture and Performance 
We have found that corporate culture is an important determinant of a firm’s 
employment policy, board, and capital structures, and interlocking shareholdings. 
Lastly, we examine whether corporate culture affects corporate performance. Since 
culture can be considered essential organizational capital, we predict that it raises 
productivity and contributes to superior performance, and put forth the following 
hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 5 (superior performance) 
Strong-culture firms perform better than weak-culture firms. 
Previous studies have not presented convincing evidence to validate this hypothesis. 
While many studies have maintained that corporate culture improves corporate 
performance, there is also research that suggests that culture, especially nonadaptive 
versions, may undermine performance (Kotter and Heskett 1992). In addition, as 
mentioned earlier, the quantitative evidence to prove that culture has a positive effect 
on performance is scant aside from the findings presented in a small number of 
exceptional works such as Denison (1984), Gordon and DiTomaso (1992), Kotter and 
                                                  
11  This explanation is consistent with interview evidence on the relationship between 
organizational capital and the possibility of hostile takeover. We interviewed an executive of a 
Japanese general trading company whose competitive edge comes from human assets. He said that 
hostile takeovers are unlikely to target general trading companies because even if a takeover were 
to occur, it would decrease shareholders’ value because core employees would depart and 
organizational capital would depreciate. Rajan and Zingales (2000) report that in the U.K. this 
actually happened to a British advertising agency, Saatchi and Saatchi. In addition, we also 
interviewed an executive of a Japanese precision machinery company whose excellent performance 
appeared to come from its R&D capabilities. He said that “raiders may be able to take over our 
company, but would not be able to manage it.” He seemed to imply that any outside investors who 
recognized their inability to manage his company would not attempt a takeover. These interview 
results suggest companies whose competitiveness stems mainly from organizational capital are less 
likely to become targets of hostile takeovers. 
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Heskett (1992), and Sorensen (2002). To provide further evidence that culture and its 
strength affects performance, we use data from Japanese firms to run the performance 
regressions.  
As a dependent variable, we adopt ROA (operating income to the book value 
of total assets; %). Independent variables include the culture variables (CULTURE, 
TOP× CULTURE, and TRAIN × CULTURE) and the size and age variables (lnTA, and 
AGE) defined in subsection 4-3. From Hypothesis 5, we predict the coefficient of 
CULTURE and the coefficients of TOP× CULTURE and TRAIN× CULTURE will be 
positive. We also estimate each regression equation including two control variables. 
These two variables are PARENT, parent company’s shareholdings ratio (%; the ratio 
of the shares held by the top shareholder whose holdings ratio exceeds 15%), and 
FOREIGN, the foreign investors’ shareholdings ratio (%; the ratio of the shares held by 
foreign investors). These variables are included to control for the effects of the external 
managerial discipline on corporate performance. The data for PARENT and FOREIGN 
are obtained from Mochiai Jokyo Chosa (Cross-Shareholding Survey) by Nippon Life 
Insurance Research Institute and Okabunushi Soran (Directory of Large Shareholders) 
by Toyo Keizai Shinposha, respectively. Their means and standard deviations are 
shown in Table 3. 
As explained earlier, we estimated the regressions by OLS, using 15 years of 
panel data from 1986 to 2000 for 128 firms. Table 8 summarizes the regression results. 
The results (5-1) and (5-1)′ show that CULTURE has significant positive coefficients. 
These results support Hypothesis 5: strong-culture firms perform better than 
weak-culture firms. Therefore, our findings indicate that corporate culture does 
enhance the corporate performance of Japanese firms.  
In addition, the results (5-2) and (5-2)′ show that culture embedding is crucial 
WIAS Discussion Paper No.2008-001? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?  
 
 24
for better performance; while the coefficients of TOP × CULTURE are insignificant, 
those of TRAIN × CULTURE are significantly positive at the 1% level. The result 
(5-2)′ indicates that if a firm has a strong culture with some cultural training systems in 
place, its ROA is 0.836 (= 0.013 + 0.823) percentage points higher than that of 
weak-culture firms. This culture effect is much larger than the size and age effects on 
ROA. The effect of a one standard deviation change in lnTA and AGE on ROA is only 
−0.267 (= −0.204 ×1.31) percentage points and −0.155 (= −0.009 ×17.25) percentage 
points, respectively. At the same time, we also found that the magnitude of the culture 
effect (0.836) is greater than the external discipline effect on ROA. Making a further 
comparison with corporate governance variables, we find that the effect of a one 
standard deviation change in PARENT and FOREIGN on ROA is 0.442 (= 0.029 × 
15.27) percentage points and 0.832 (= 0.110 ×7.57) percentage points, respectively. 
These results allow us to assert that corporate culture and its cultural strength are 
important determinants of corporate performance in Japan, with performance effects 
that are larger than or at least the same magnitude as those of corporate governance 
variables. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
In conclusion, we state once again that corporate culture does matter. Using 
data on Japanese firms from 1986 to 2000, when Japanese firms faced large business 
fluctuations stemming from the burgeoning and bursting of the bubble, and subsequent 
prolonged recession, we have shown that corporate culture and cultural strength 
significantly influence corporate policies affecting employment, board, and financial 
structures. At the same time, we have also confirmed that culture and the embedding of 
culture enhance corporate performance. These culture effects are found to be 
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considerable in magnitude and greater than other factors. Corporate culture, often 
viewed as unobservable, ambiguous, and hard to measure by academics, is a crucial 
determinant of corporate policies and performance. 
Japanese companies have long been thought to have derived competitive 
advantages from the corporate cultures that they have developed (Ouchi, 1981: Pascale 
and Athos,1981). Scholars, however, have provided little quantitative evidence that 
would prove the importance of culture to Japanese firms. Through business upturns 
and downturns, strong-culture firms are more likely to adopt policies that encourage 
long-term employment, and to have more managers promoted from within than 
weak-culture firms. Strong-culture firms are also more likely to have lower debt levels, 
and a higher percentage of interlocking shareholdings than weak-culture firms. We 
provide evidence here that indicates that strong-culture Japanese firms consider culture 
to be a form of organizational capital which has significant effects on their strategies 
and policies. 
The finance literature suggests that some of the above policy choices would 
result in lower performance and potential agency problems. For example, lower debt 
levels are often associated with the free cash flow problem and interlocking 
shareholdings are thought to induce insider control problems (Jensen,1986: Miyajima 
and Kuroki, 2007). Surprisingly enough, firms with strong culture achieved relatively 
higher levels of performance throughout this period. This result indicates that corporate 
culture enhances corporate performance in the long run. 
Our empirical results also help us to understand the organizational behavior of 
Japanese firms in recent years. During the long economic downturn from the 1990s to 
2000s in Japan (sometimes called “the lost decade”), Japanese firms were criticized in 
the press and mass media for their resistance to change. The firms did not lay off 
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employees in spite of their lower profitability, and were accused of placing too much 
importance on financial stability and not enough on dividends to shareholders. In 
addition, most firms did not seem to have made the transition to U.S.-style, 
shareholder-oriented corporate governance systems, and only a small percentage of 
Japanese firms appointed outsiders to their boards of directors. However, our empirical 
results suggest that the seemingly conservative behavior of Japanese firms can in fact 
be viewed as a reflection of decisions that were rationally made in order to maintain 
their corporate culture as a source of competitive advantage. Our findings suggest that 
recognizing the importance of culture will enable us to view corporations and 
corporate policies in a new light.  
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TSE Code Company's Name TSE Code Company's Name
1332 Nippon Suisan Kaisha, Ltd. 1377 Sakata Seed Corp.
1801 Taisei Corp. 1886 Aoki Corp.
1802 Obayashi Corp. 1812 Kajima Corp.
1804 Sato Kogyo Co., Ltd. 1833 Okumura Corp.
1824 Maeda Corp. 1821 Mitsui Construction Co., Ltd.
1911 Sumitomo Forestry Co., Ltd. 1868 Mitsui Home Co., Ltd.
1941 Chudenko Corp. 1946 Toenec Corp.
2202 Meiji Seika Kaisha, Ltd. 2211 Fujiya Co., Ltd.
2502 Asahi Breweries, Ltd. 2501 Sapporo Breweries, Ltd.
3105 Nisshinbo Industries, Inc. 3106 Kurabo Industries Ltd.
3407 Asahi Chemical Industry Co., Ltd. 4005 Sumitomo Chemical Co., Ltd.
3591 Wacoal Co., Ltd. 3501 Suminoe Textile Co., Ltd.
4023 Kureha Chemical Co., Ltd. 4186 Tokyo Ohka Kogyo Co., Ltd.
4204 Sekisui Chemical Co., Ltd. 4063 Shin-Etsu Chemical Co., Ltd.
4205 Nippon Zeon Co., Ltd. 4028 Ishihara Sangyo Kaisha, Ltd.
4403 NOF Corp. 4409 Harima Chemical, Inc.
4452 Kao Corp. 4461 Dai-ichi Kogyo Seiyaku Co., Ltd.
4613 Kansai Paint Co., Ltd. 4612 Nippon Paint Co., Ltd.
5014 Japan Energy Corp. 5009 Fuji Kosan Co., Ltd.
5101 The Yokohama Rubber Co., Ltd. 5110 Sumitomo Rubber Industries, Ltd.
5105 Toyo Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd. 5106 The Ohtsu Tire & Rubber Co., Ltd.
5201 Asahi Glass Co., Ltd. 5202 Nippon Steel Glass Co., Ltd.
5403 Kawasaki Steel Corp. 5406 Kobe Steel, Ltd
5471 Daido Steel Co., Ltd. 5476 Nippon Koshuha Steel Co., Ltd.
5482 Aichi Steel Corp. 5632 Mitsubishi Steel Mfg. Co., Ltd.
5602 Kurimoto, Ltd. 5633 Kanto Special Steel Works, Ltd.
5991 NHK Spring Co., Ltd. 5716 Nippon Mining & Metals Co., Ltd.
6473 Koyo Seiko Co., Ltd. 6480 Nippon Thompson Co., Ltd.
6501 Hitachi, Ltd. 6503 Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
6645 Omron Corp. 6954 Fanuc Ltd.
6701 NEC Corp. 6704 Iwatsu Electric Co., Ltd.
6703 Oki Electric Industry Co., Ltd. 6815 Uniden Corp.
6708 Toyo Communication 6759 Tokin Corp.
6752 Matsushita Electric Industrial 6758 Sony Corp.
6764 Sanyo Electric Co., Ltd. 6765 Kenwood Corp.
6768 Tamura Corp. 6705 NEC Infrontia Corp.
6798 SMK Corp. 6717 Fujitsu Denso Ltd.
6845 Yamatake Corp. 7735 Dainippon Screen Mfg. Co., Ltd.
6931 Japan Storage Battery Co., Ltd. 6934 Shin-kobe Electric Machinery Co., Ltd.
6991 Matsushita Electric Works, Ltd. 6810 Hitachi MaXell, Ltd
7004 Hitachi Zosen Corp. 6273 SMC Corp.
7011 Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd. 6412 Heiwa Corp.
7205 Hino Motors, Ltd. 7269 Suzuki Motor Corp.
7272 Yamaha Motor Co., Ltd. 7222 Nissan Shatai Co., Ltd.
7282 Toyota Gosei Co., Ltd. 7275 Unishia Jecs Corp.
7701 Shimadzu Corp. 7744 Noritsu Koki Co., Ltd.
7723 Aichi Tokei Denki Co., Ltd. 7724 Kimmon Mfg. Co., Ltd.
7751 Canon Inc. 6594 Nidec Corp.
7752 Ricoh Co., Ltd. 6146 Disco Corp.
7753 Minolta Co., Ltd. 7732 Topcon Corp.
7936 Asics Corp. 7955 Cleanup Corp.
8001 Itochu Corp. 8063 Nissho Iwai Corp.
8002 Marubeni Corp. 8031 Mitusi & Co., Ltd
8013 Naigai Co., Ltd. 8193 Suzutan Co., Ltd.
8231 Mitsukoshi, Ltd. 8242 Hankyu Department Stores, Inc.
8233 Takashimaya Co., Ltd. 8245 Maruei Department Store Co., Ltd.
8238 Isetan  Co., Ltd. 8232 Tokyu Department Store Co., Ltd.
9020 East Japan Railway Co. 9022 Central Japan Railway Co.
9031 Nishi-Nippon Rail Road Co., Ltd. 9009 Keisei Electric Railway Co., Ltd.
9064 Yamato Transport Co., Ltd. 9062 Nippon Express Co., Ltd.
9065 Sankyu Inc. 9075 Fukuyama Transporting Co., Ltd.
9101 Nippon Yusen K.K 9104 Mitsui O.S.K. Lines, Ltd.
9201 Japan Airlines Co., Ltd. 9231 Kokusai Kogyo Co., Ltd.
9310 Japan Transcity Corp. 9302 Mitsui - Soko Co., Ltd.
Strong Culture Firms (64 firms) Weak Culture Firms (64 firms)
Table 1  Sample Firms
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Table 2 Content of Mission Statements 
 
Panel A: Values / Philosophies/ Objectives of the Firm  
Contribute to society, happiness of mankind, the creation of culture, and global 
prosperity  
71.9 % 
Concern for the interests of shareholders 6.3 % 
Respect employees’ livelihoods, happiness, prosperity, sense of job security 12.5 % 
Skill formation of employees 14.1 % 
Provide workplace that allows employees to demonstrate their capabilities, and 
to pursue fulfilling work 
37.5 % 
Concern for customers 37.5 % 
Commitment to high quality product 35.9 % 
Commitment to higher technology 29.7 % 
Concern for growth of firm, corporate group 15.6 % 
Concern for performance (including stability) 9.4 % 
Concern for environment 17.2 % 
Concern for local community 10.9 % 
 
Panel B: Norms and Behavioral Standards 
Conscientiousness and cordiality on the job 31.3 % 
Innovation and originality 45.3 % 
Rise to challenges, aggressiveness 18.8 % 
Cooperation 10.9 % 
To live together with neighbors in harmony 9.4 % 
Fairness and transparency 6.3 % 
The table shows the content of mission statements of 64 strong-culture firms, and the percentages 
of these firms which refer to these particular values, objectives, norms, etc. in their mission 
statements. 
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Total Strong Culture Weak Culture
Sample Firms Firms
EMP 15.95 16.35 15.56 0.79 ***
(years) [3.73] [3.35] [4.03]
INSIDER 90.25 92.60 87.89 4.71 ***
(%) [11.61] [8.85] [13.43]
DEBT 62.85 63.26 62.43 0.83
(%) [18.63] [16.32] [20.69]
INTERLOCK 26.25 28.91 23.59 5.32 ***
(%) [11.11] [9.65] [11.82]
ln TA 12.56 12.92 12.20 0.71 ***
(million yen) [1.31] [1.21] [1.32]
AGE 57.31 58.72 55.90 2.82 ***
(years) [17.25] [16.57] [17.79]
ROA 3.13 3.26 3.00 0.26 *
(%) [2.93] [2.74] [3.10]
MKTBK 1.50 1.48 1.53 -0.04
[0.63] [0.53] [0.73]
PARENT 7.65 3.94 11.36 -7.42 ***
(%) [15.27] [10.56] [18.10]
FOREIGN 7.34 8.30 6.38 1.92 ***
(%) [7.57] [8.02] [6.97]
Sample Size 1628 814 814
(0.000)
Table 3  Descriptive Statistics 
Difference
(0.000)
(0.000)
Figures in the  Total Sample, Strong Culture Firms, and Weak Culture Firms columns are sample means.
(0.367)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.072)
(0.115)
(0.000)
P-values are in parentheses.
Figures in the Difference column are the differences in means between the strong culture sample and  
the weak culture sample. ***, **, * indicate that the difference is significant at 1, 5, 10% level, respectively.
Standard deviations are in brackets.
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11.39 *** 12.56 *** 11.43 *** 12.67 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.593 *** 0.648 *** 0.268 0.247
(0.001) (0.000) (0.143) (0.177)
0.930 *** 0.980 ***
(0.001) (0.001)
0.284 0.457 *
(0.281) (0.083)
0.097 0.083 0.099 0.078
(0.115) (0.180) (0.127) (0.233)
0.045 *** 0.042 *** 0.043 *** 0.040 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.167 *** -0.185 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.134 -0.073
(0.462) (0.689)
Year Dummy
R2
Sample Size
Yes Yes
Table 4 Corporte Culture and Employment Policy 
Dependent variables: EMP
(1-1) (1-1)' (1-2) (1-2)'
Intercept
CULTURE
TOP × CULTURE
TRAIN × CULTURE
ln TA
AGE
ROA
MKTBK
0.088 0.107
Yes Yes
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, level , respectively.
P-values, calculated by White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consisitent standard errors, are in parentheses.
0.095 0.116
1628 1628 1628 1628
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74.66 *** 71.74 *** 74.66 *** 71.50 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
3.924 *** 3.771 *** 4.124 *** 4.179 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.627 -0.749
(0.406) (0.330)
-0.147 -0.586
(0.820) (0.366)
0.622 *** 0.658 *** 0.618 *** 0.672 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
0.121 *** 0.128 *** 0.121 *** 0.130 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.452 *** 0.469 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.252 0.206
(0.631) (0.697)
Year Dummy
R2
Sample Size 1628 1628 1628 1628
ln TA
AGE
ROA
MKTBK
Intercept
CULTURE
TOP × CULTURE
TRAIN × CULTURE
Table 5  Corporate Culture and Board Sturucture  
Dependent variables: INSIDER
(2-1) (2-1)' (2-2) (2-2)'
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, level , respectively.
P-values, calculated by White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consisitent standard errors, are in parentheses.
Yes Yes
0.079 0.092
Yes Yes
0.080 0.093
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2.815 16.92 *** 2.801 18.18 ***
(0.544) (0.001) (0.551) (0.000)
-3.046 *** -2.626 *** -2.222 ** -2.504 ***
(0.000) (0.002) (0.023) (0.009)
-2.542 * -2.595 *
(0.089) (0.099)
-0.633 0.996
(0.553) (0.345)
4.776 *** 4.608 *** 4.764 *** 4.520 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.163 *** 0.137 *** 0.166 *** 0.137 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-1.457 *** -1.442 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
-3.044 *** -3.202 ***
(0.002) (0.001)
Year Dummy
R2
Sample Size
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table 6  Corporate Culture and Capital Structure   
Dependent variables: DEBT
(3-1) (3-1)' (3-2) (3-2)'
Intercept
CULTURE
ROA
MKTBK
TOP × CULTURE
TRAIN × CULTURE
ln TA
AGE
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, level , respectively.
P-values, calculated by White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consisitent standard errors, are in parentheses.
0.151 0.223
1628 1628 1628 1628
0.149 0.222
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27.13 *** 29.63 *** 27.05 *** 33.23 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5.385 *** 5.671 *** 7.737 *** 7.684 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-7.154 *** -6.897 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
-1.855 *** -1.309 *
(0.008) (0.062)
-0.617 *** -0.653 *** -0.648 *** -0.707 ***
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
0.135 *** 0.123 *** 0.144 *** 0.132 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.743 *** -0.646 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.675 0.251
(0.196) (0.616)
Year Dummy
R2
Sample Size
Yes Yes
Table 7 Corporate Culture and Interlocking Shareholdings 
Dependent variables: INTERLOCK
(4-1) (4-1)' (4-2) (4-2)'
Intercept
CULTURE
TOP × CULTURE
TRAIN × CULTURE
ln TA
AGE
Yes Yes
ROA
MKTBK
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, level , respectively.
P-values, calculated by White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consisitent standard errors, are in parentheses.
0.186 0.210
1628 1628 1628 1628
0.144 0.174
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5.279 *** 5.132 *** 5.779 *** 5.677 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.356 *** 0.419 *** -0.099 0.013
(0.010) (0.003) (0.534) (0.934)
0.332 0.205
(0.137) (0.334)
0.887 *** 0.823 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
-0.068 -0.168 *** -0.102 * -0.204 ***
(0.193) (0.005) (0.054) (0.001)
-0.016 *** -0.007 ** -0.018 *** -0.009 ***
(0.000) (0.036) (0.000) (0.007)
0.031 *** 0.029 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
0.111 *** 0.110 ***
(0.000) (0.000)
Year Dummy
R2
Sample Size
Yes Yes
Table 8  Corporate Culture and Profitability 
Dependent variables: ROA
(5-1) (5-1)' (5-2) (5-2)'
Intercept
CULTURE
TOP × CULTURE
TRAIN × CULTURE
ln TA
AGE
Yes Yes
PARENT
FOREIGN
***, **, and * indicate that the coefficient is significant at the 1%, 5%, 10%, level , respectively.
P-values, calculated by White's (1980) heteroskedastic-consisitent standard errors, are in parentheses.
0.103 0.185
1628 1628 1628 1628
0.090 0.174
 
